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Making Sure Children Find Their
Way Home
OBLIGATING STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW TO RETURN DEPENDENT CHILDREN TO
FAMILY MEMBERS ABROAD*
I. INTRODUCTION
Ease in international trade, travel, and communication
has made it easier for families to move abroad while
maintaining strong ties to their home country. Immigrants
often bring their children with them or have children after they
arrive. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, almost twenty
percent of children residing in the United States have at least
one foreign-born parent, up five percent from 1994.'
Approximately 2.5 million children living in the United States
are not American citizens.' Inevitably, some of these children
will become dependents of the state, due either to a parent's
death or the child's removal on the basis of abuse or neglect
© 2004 Amity R. Boye. All Rights Reserved.
Forum on Child and Family Statistics, America's Children: Key Indications
of Well-Being, at 5 (2004) (reporting statistics from the U.S. Census), available at
http://childstats.gov/americaschildren/pdf/ac04brief. pdf.
' U.S. Census Bureau, Table 1.1. Population by Sex, Age, and Citizenship
Status (March 2000), available at http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/
foreignlp20-534/tab0101.pdf. Additional evidence of the growing population of recently
immigrated children in the U.S. is reflected in statistics regarding the linguistic
abilities of the nation's children: In 1999, approximately 17 percent of children in the
U.S. spoke a second language. Five percent of those children were reported to speak
English with difficulty, nearly double the number since 1979. See Forum on Child and
Family Statistics, supra note 1, at 14; Forum on Child and Family Statistics, Table
Pop5: Difficulty Speaking English - 1979-99, available at http://www.childstats.gov
ac2004ltablespop5.asp (last visited Aug. 25, 2004).
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allegations! When a child comes into state care, the first
priority is to place the child with the closest living relative.' If
the child cannot successfully be placed with a parent, child
welfare officials look to other relatives, such as grandparents or
aunts, who are willing to take custody of the child, either
permanently or temporarily. The difficulty in cases concerning
children of immigrants is that often the closest living relative
resides in another country.' Many hurdles exist in the process
of placing a child in the care of someone outside of the country.
The decentralized and underfunded foster care system in the
United States does not lend itself to transnational placements.
Many placements will fail and many will not even be
attempted. As a result, children end up left behind in a country
to which they have little or no connection, stagnating in a
foster care system that places them in institutionalized homes
or adopts them away to strangers. Despite competent relatives
in their home country who are ready and willing to take
custody, most of these children remain trapped in a land
foreign to them because there is no framework to protect their
best interests or implement their individual and family rights.
' In fact, evidence suggests that recently immigrated children are more
likely than other children to end up in the foster care system due to abuse or neglect.
Statistics report that children with foreign-born parents (28%) are more likely than
children with native-born parents (20%) to live below the poverty level. Forum on Child
and Family Statistics, Children of at Least One Foreign-Born Parent, at
http://childstats.gov/americaschildren/pdf/ac04brief.pdf (last visited Aug. 25, 2004).
Statistics also show a correlation between poverty and maltreatment. Jill Goldman et
al., U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, A Coordinated Response to Child Abuse
and Neglect: The Foundation for Practice, at 33 & n.73 (2003). One study found that
children from families with annual incomes below $15,000 were twenty-two times more
likely to be abused or neglected than children from families with annual incomes above
$30,000. Id.
' In the case of parental death, this means attempting placement with the
surviving parent, if any. In the case of abuse or neglect, this means either eventual
reunification with the parent from which the child was removed or placement with the
other parent, if any.
' This situation commonly results when a family has recently immigrated,
when a parent gets deported, or in the situation of mixed nationality marriages.
Of the total foreign-born population, 39.5% arrived to the United States
sometime within the last 14 years. Many of these new residents are thus likely to still
have strong family ties to their home country. U.S. Census Bureau, Table 1.6. Year of
Entry of the Foreign-Born Population by Sex and Citizenship Status (March 2000),
available at http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/ foreign/p20-534/tab0106.pdf.
' International placements occur everyday in the adoption and immigration
context, but not so in the child protection context. In adoption, parents will go to any
length (both financially and geographically) to adopt a child from abroad. In
immigration, especially in current times, the government is anxious to deport visa
violators, even if they are children. Unlike adoption and immigration, there is no force
motivating foreign placements in foster care. The dependent children cannot speak for
themselves and no one else speaks on their behalf.
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A parent or relative's location abroad presents many
challenges for any child welfare agency assigned by the state to
oversee the welfare of the child. Such agencies are local
institutions ill equipped to initiate and manage transnational
relationships with relatives seeking custody. There are many
unavoidable obstacles, including information disadvantages,
financial limitations, cultural differences, communication
barriers, and the involvement of multiple judicial systems. How
a child welfare agency should proceed in such cases is a
difficult question. Agencies are often reluctant and many never
attempt to tackle the legal, financial and logistical hurdles
involved in returning a child to her home country. Some
agencies seize upon the initial "uncooperative" behavior of the
parental resource7 in order to justify terminating parental
rights or ceasing efforts to place the child abroad, despite the
fact that such conduct would never be enough in a domestic
setting to cease placement efforts. For example, many relatives
cannot travel to the jurisdiction where the child is located to
facilitate the process of their approval as custodians and to
participate in visits with the child. However, child welfare
officials often hold this failure to travel to their jurisdiction
against the relatives seeking custody, even though they may
have legitimate financial, occupational, or familial
responsibilities that prevent an extended absence from their
home country.
International law and domestic law8 generally favor
returning a child to parents and relatives instead of placement
in foster care. Foster care is disfavored because it usually
entails separating the child from her family and placing the
child with a stranger. Many children are not even lucky enough
to be placed with a foster parent, but are instead sent to live in
"group homes" - institutions lacking family settings and often
filled with children who have emotional and physical problems.
' The term "parental resource" refers to any relative expressing a
willingness to take care and custody of a dependent child. It may include a respondent
parent accused of abuse or neglect, a non-respondent parent, a surviving but non-
custodial divorced parent, any other known relative of the child, or any third party in
loco parentis of the child.
' References to domestic law refer to any federal or state laws contained
within a national system. Domestic law in international terminology means municipal
law, or in other words, the "internal law of a naticn, as opposed to international law."
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 428 (Pocket ed. 1996). In the United States, domestic law
will primarily refer to state law since all child welfare proceedings are administered on
the state level. Some federal constitutional principles also apply to certain aspects of
child protection law.
1517
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Child welfare agencies routinely fail to respect legally
recognized principles favoring placement within the family -
sometimes deliberately and sometimes as a result of a lack of
resources - even when it is clearly in the child's best interests.!
Consider the following story about a boy named
Jonathan. Jonathan was only three months old when his father
took him to Hawaii.'" While there, Jonathan was placed into
foster care because his father had a mental disability
preventing him from adequately caring for the child."
Jonathan's mother was residing in the Philippines at the time
and unable to obtain a visa to come to the U.S. 2 She was in
frequent contact with the family court and social workers and
on numerous occasions pleaded for the return of her son.
13
Twenty-one months passed before Jonathan's mother was
properly served and represented by counsel at court
proceedings in the U.S.' The child welfare agency expressed
frustration with the Mother's continued residence in the
Philippines and the agency's inability to secure a home study
or psychological evaluation of the mother." After eight and a
half years of court proceedings, including numerous
termination hearings and appeals, the Supreme Court of
Hawaii issued a final ruling in favor of Jonathan's mother. 6 At
age nine, Jonathan was finally returned to his mother's custody
after spending most of his life in foster care. 7
The caseworker's decision not to proactively pursue
reunification with the child's mother abroad had a profound
effect on Jonathan's life. For eight and a half years, he lived in
' See E.R. v. Marion County, 729 N.E.2d 1052 (Ind. App. 2000) (denying
placement with relative in Mexico because of lack of agreement or procedure regarding
who would translate the home study); In re Yuridia, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 921 (Cal. App.
1998) (denying placement with grandparents in Mexico because they failed to get an
official Mexican decree, which they were not subsequently granted time to obtain); In
re Stephanie M, 867 P.2d 706 (Cal. 1994) (denying custody to grandmother although
her home had been approved, Mexican officials had vowed to monitor the case, and
grandmother had agreed to be bound by Mexican authorities); L.H. v. Youth Welfare
Office of Wiesbaden, Germany, 568 N.Y.S.2d 852 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1991) (noting that
German court refused to accept American home studies).
" In re Jon Doe, 926 P.2d 1290 (Haw. 1996). The child's name was not really
Jonathan. Jonathan was derived from "Jon Doe" and chosen for ease of telling the story
behind this case.
Id. at 1292.
Id. at 1292-94.
Id.
14 Id.
"5 926 P.2d at 1294.
16 Id. at 1300.
17 Id.
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the foster care system with no sense of permanency. If the
caseworker had been obligated and able to obtain the
information necessary to make a custody determination (such
as a home study and psychological evaluation of the mother),
Jonathan's fate would have been decided within a much more
appropriate time frame and Jonathan would have been spared
a lengthy period of instability and separation from his mother.
Jonathan's story involved a non-American parent
struggling with the U.S. judicial system for the return of her
son. Now consider the similar but converse story of an
American parent fighting a foreign judicial system. In October
1992, Joseph Cooke's ex-wife went on a trip to her home
country of Germany, taking with her the divorced couple's two
children. 8 On the verge of a nervous breakdown, Cooke's ex-
wife surrendered the children to German authorities and
released them for adoption. " The German court never
attempted to contact Cooke, and when he petitioned German
courts for custody, all he got in reply was a bill for child
support.0 Despite the fact that the children's permanent
country of residence was the United States and the fact that a
U.S. court granted custody to Cooke, German courts refused to
acknowledge Cooke's claims or the possibility that returning
the children to their father could be in their best interests.2
Cooke traveled numerous times to Germany to grapple with
the judicial system and make attempts to visit his children.2 In
the United States, Cooke spent a considerable amount of time
and money fighting for the return of his children, only to
endure the apathy of American diplomats unwilling to take
decisive action on his behalf.3 Even though a New York court
certified a report holding Cooke to be a fit father with an
appropriate home, German courts never granted custody to
Cooke.2 They did not even grant access for visits.5 Cooke has
not given up fighting for his two children, but as of June 2002,
even after President Clinton personally requested Chancellor
" Cindy Loose & William Drozdiak, A Family Kept Apart: U.S. Father Loses
Custody of Children to German Couple, WASH. POST, May 7, 2000, at Al.
19 Imre Karacs, Clinton to Tackle Berlin Over the 'Stolen Children', THE
INDEPENDENT (London), May 31, 2000, at 18.
20 id.
21 Loose & Drozdiak, supra note 18.
22 Id.
23Id.
Id.
2 Id.
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Schroeder to help Mr. Cooke, the children remain in foster care
in Germany."
Even though general international standards of child
welfare law suggest the children should have been returned to
their father,27 German officials nevertheless felt they were
under no obligation to grant Cooke custody, even after a clear
demonstration of his desire and competence to care for the
children.' After a protracted series of judicial proceedings,
enough time elapsed for German officials to claim the children
had become too attached to their new culture and family.' If
there is a system in place to bill parents abroad for child
support, there also, at the very least, ought to be a system in
place to reunify families and children who find themselves
separated by legal and physical borders. Situations like this,
which are just as unfair to children as they are to parents,
would not be allowed if nations were by law required to respect
the familial bond between natural parents and their children.
In this situation, such a requirement would call for the
imposition of an obligation on German child welfare officials to
work with Cooke towards reunification. Even though such an
obligation can be implied from current international standards,
countries like Germany will not feel compelled to observe such
standards unless there is a legally binding body of law that
imposes specific obligations.
As this Note will argue, international law should adopt
specific provisions imposing an obligation on states to pursue
reunification of a child with a parent, or in the alternative,
placement with a relative." Moreover, this obligation should be
no less applicable solely because of geographical distance of the
parental resource. Calling for an international solution may
seem to be a sweeping proposal, but the dimensions of this
problem demand it. The issue of child welfare is a matter of
universal human rights, and the successful implementation of
the proposed obligation requires international cooperation.
2 Kevin Chaffee, Fighting for Abducted Children, June 7, 2002, WASH.
TIMES, at B9.
27 See infra Part III.A.
' Chaffee, supra note 26.
29Id.
"Reunification" refers to the process of working towards the return of the
child to one of his natural parents. "Placement," unless otherwise specified, refers to
the process of giving custody of the child either permanently or temporarily to a
relative. "Relative" means a non-custodial parent, grandparent, sibling, aunt, uncle,
other family member, or in some cases, a close family friend.
[Vol. 69:41520
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Thus, in addition to imposing an obligation on countries to
make sure their child welfare systems keep children with their
families, regardless of the distance that may separate them,
international law should also establish a practical framework
that enables countries and their child welfare agencies to meet
this obligation.
This Note begins in Part II with an overview of the
universal and guiding standards of child protection law. Part
III examines specific principles derived from these standards,
both in domestic and international law. This Part argues that
these principles support imposing an obligation on nations to
work toward reunification with the parent or placement with a
relative. Part IV argues that this obligation should be observed
regardless of where the parental resource resides. Part V
explains why this obligation should be explicitly codified. Part
VI argues that this codification should be part of international
law and explores various existing legal mechanisms that could
assist in implementing the proposed obligation, concluding
with some suggestions about what an ideal mechanism would
include."
II. GuIDING STANDARDS OF CHILD PROTECTION LAW
There are two guiding standards in both international
and domestic law that set the overall framework for any claim
made with respect to a child's welfare. The first is the best
interests standard, which is widely accepted as the
fundamental and overriding concern to be applied in every
legal proceeding involving children. The second is the
protection of familial and parental rights. Although also
important, this second consideration often conflicts with a
child's best interests and has been increasingly qualified to
include fewer and fewer entitlements. If a parent's rights
conflict with a child's welfare, the child's best interests must
prevail. 2
31 This Note does not directly address the various immigration issues that
apply to the separated families who are the focus of this Note.
Also, while this Note is international in scope, it will take an American
perspective of domestic law, drawing most illustrations of the problem from U.S.
statistics and jurisprudence.
2 See In re Kerry D., 737 A.2d 662, 669 (N.H. 1999); In re J.S.N., 371 N.W.2d
361, 365 (S.D. 1985); In re A.B.E., 564 A.2d 751, 754 (D.C. 1989); In re C.A.R., 693 P.2d
1214, 1219 (Mont. 1984) (quoting section of Montana code that states "when the rights
of a youth to an adequate physical and emotional environment encounter demonstrated
acts of commission or omission by the parents which deprive the youth of this
1521
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A. Best Interests
Under international law and under most national legal
systems, the most important consideration in any child welfare
case is the best interests of the child. The United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) states that "[i]n
all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public
or private social welfare institutions, courts of law,
administrative authorities, or legislative bodies, the best
interests of the child shall be a primary consideration."33 In
1986, the United Nations General Assembly issued a set of
declarations, embodied in U.N. Resolution 41/85, setting forth
guiding principles with respect to dependent children.' Similar
to the CRC, Resolution 41/85 states, "In all matters relating to
the placement of a child outside the care of the child's own
parents, the best interests of the child, particularly his or her
need for affection and right to security and continuing care,
should be the paramount consideration."' Similarly, the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women states that in matters regarding guardianship,
"the interests of the children shall be paramount.""
This standard is also widely recognized on the domestic
level. The United States unequivocally applies the best
interests standard37 and most other countries in the world have
codified the dominant standard of a child-centered approach
environment, the best interest of the youth is paramount and takes precedence over
parental rights or familial bonds"); In re Lee, 442 A.2d 893, 897 (R.I. 1982) ("although
the rights of the parents are a 'most essential consideration' in such proceedings, the
children's best interests and welfare outweigh all other considerations"); Convention on
the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., art. 3.
" Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N.
GAOR, 44th Sess., art. 3. Even though the United States has signed, but not ratified
this document, all U.S. states apply the best interests standard. See infra note 37 and
accompanying text. Also, a federal court has ruled that the CRC has gained the status
of customary international law. Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
' United Nations Declaration on Social and Legal Principles Relating to the
Protection and Welfare of Children, with Special Reference to Foster Placement and
Adoption, Nationally and Internationally, G.A. Res. 41/85, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess.
(1986).
Id. art. 5.
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, art. 16(1)(f).
" See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Conway v. Preston, 24 A.2d 772, 772 (Pa.
1942) ("The guiding star for the court in coming to a conclusion ... is the welfare of the
child. To this all other considerations are subordinate."). See also 59 AM. JUR. 2D
Parent and Child § 26 (2004) ("What action is in the best interest of the child always
governs decisions involving custodial matters.").
[Vol. 69:41522
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into their domestic laws.' Based on this state practice, the
above-mentioned instruments, and corresponding opinio juris,
many argue that the best interests standard has achieved the
status of customary international law."
The best interests of a child is not merely the most
important factor in a child welfare case; it is the overriding
factor. All other considerations are secondary."0 For another
factor to carry weight, it must be couched in terms of the child's
welfare. To illustrate this point, consider a child with severe
behavioral problems who the state has removed because the
3 See, e.g., BGB § 1671(2) (Germany) (stating the family court in Germany is
to reach "a decision which most closely corresponds to the well-being of the child"),
cited in Schiereck v. Schiereck, 439 N.E.2d 859, 861 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982); GUARDIANS
AND WARDS ACT § 17 (Pakistan) ("In appointing or declaring the guardian of the minor,
the Court shall ... be guided by what ... appears in the circumstances to be for the
welfare of the minor."), cited in Hosain v. Malik, 671 A.2d 988, 998 (Md. Ct. Spec. App
1996); but see Amin v. Bakhaty, 812 So.2d 12, 21 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (finding that
Egyptian courts are not compelled to consider the child's best interest); Ramadan,
supra note 39, at 608-09 ("While some Arab States have recognized [the best interests]
principle in certain cases, it is certainly not universally applicable to the entire subject
of child custody. It does not constitute a "fundamental principle" as it does in the
French law, or even in Israeli law. Some Arab States attach greater importance than
others to the child's best interests, but even then, it does not constitute an exclusive
interest.").
" One U.S. federal court found that the best interests provision of the CRC
was a codification of customary international law:
The CRC has been adopted by every organized government in the
world except the United States. This overwhelming acceptance is strong
reason to hold that some CRC provisions have attained the status of
customary international law.
While the CRC is relatively new, it contains many provisions codifying
longstanding legal norms. It states that "the family... should be afforded the
necessary protection and assistance" and that "in all actions concerning
children... the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration."
These provisions of the CRC are not so novel as to be considered outside the
bounds of what is customary. Similar doctrines have long been a part of our
law.... They are also applied by other nations.... Given its widespread
acceptance, to the extent that it acts to codify longstanding, widely-accepted
principles of law, the CRC should be read as customary international law.
Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 597-601 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). See also Moussa Abou
Ramadan, The Transition from Tradition to Reform: The Shari'a Appeals Court
Rulings on Child Custody (1992-2001), 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 595, 607 (2003) ("The
principle of the child's best interests is enshrined in international law . . . ."); Sonja
Starr & Lea Brilmayer, Family Separation as a Violation of International Law, 21
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 213, 230 n.111 (2003) (noting that while a continued international
dialogue will produce increasing consensus on the "meaning and implications" of the
best interests principle, "[tihe best interest principle itself probably enjoys the status of
customary international law already").
' See, e.g., Cushman v. Lane, 277 S.W.2d 72, 74 (Ark. 1955) ("The controlling
consideration in determining the custody of an infant is the best interest and welfare of
the infant, that is, the physical, intellectual, moral, and spiritual well-being of the
child, and to this all other considerations are subordinate."); U.N. Resolution 41185,
supra note 34, art.5 (stating that the best interests of the child is the "paramount
consideration") (emphasis added). See also supra note 32.
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parents are unable to control her and who is a danger to herself
and others. The state will often medicate the child because it is
the quickest and easiest solution, although counseling and a
modified school setting may prove to be more effective and less
numbing." The best interests standard does not permit forced
medication simply because it will result in improved behavior.
The state must show that the child should be medicated for her
own interests, not for the sake of her parents, for her teacher,
for the state as a cost-saving measure, or for any other person
or entity.
Best interests determinations are often difficult since
there is no single definition or complete list of relevant factors.
Theoretically, the list of relevant factors includes anything that
could conceivably affect the child's well-being. As a result, child
welfare decisions are incredibly fact driven. Decision makers
possess a great amount of discretion." As the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court noted, "[s]tandards of mathematical
precision are neither possible nor desirable in this field; much
must be left to the trial judge's experience and judgment.
Underlying each case are predictions as to the possible future
development of a child, and these are beyond truly accurate
forecast."43
Such decisions are not only difficult, but are also
susceptible to cultural and personal bias. While any process
involving great amounts of discretion creates a potential for
such abuse, decisions regarding children and families are
particularly vulnerable since people tend to hold strong and
inflexible opinions about the proper functioning of families."
41 See Carol Marbin Miller, Bill to Regulate Psychiatric-Drug Use on Foster
Kids Pushed, MLAMI HERALD, January 13, 2002, at 2B.
42 In re Minor (No. 2), 327 N.E.2d 875, 878-79 (Mass. 1975) (Best interests
determinations are "a classic example of a discretionary decision.").
In re New England Home for Little Wanderers, 328 N.E.2d 854, 863 (Mass.
1975).
See generally Kathryn L. Mercer, A Content Analysis Of Judicial Decision-
Making: How Judges Use the Primary Caretaker Standard to Make a Custody
Determination, 5 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 31-33, 39-40 ("critics found that the
phrase [best interests of child] was used to justify any decision reached").
The concept of "children's best interests," unlike such concepts as distance or
mass, has no objective content. Whenever the word "best" is used, one must
always ask "according to whom?" The state, the parents, and the child might
all be sources of views, worthy of consideration, about the child's interests
and how best to serve them.
Id. at 31 (quoting David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody
Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477, 488-89 (1984)).
Given the wide discretion inherent in the standard, a judge is often free to
apply her own ethical standard while reiterating the best interests test.
[Vol. 69:41624
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Although there may be many appropriate ways to raise a child,
most people believe that there is one best method. As such,
many jurisdictions find it necessary to establish guidelines to
structure best interests decisions and provide an adequate
basis for review. Some jurisdictions include lists of "typically
relevant" factors and others identify an ordered list of
"preferred" factors.4 1 Still, it is important for every decision
maker to keep in mind that these are just guidelines. There are
no hard and fast rules.
B. Protecting Family and Parental Rights
Subordinate to best interests, but still relevant in many
jurisdictions, are the rights of the family and parents.
1. Familial Integrity - An International Concept
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),
the world's most influential human rights document,6 states
that "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with
his . . . family" and that "[tihe family is the natural and
fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection
by society and the State."" The International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights replicates these ideas. 8 The purpose of
these provisions is to stress the government's duty to avoid
taking action that would fragment families, including an
affirmative duty to assist families in ways that keep them
together.
Furthermore, sometimes all ethical perspectives are used, resulting in
subjective judicial outcomes, in order to justify conflicting custody awards.
When the best interests of the child are not clearly defined, the judge must
impose her own ethical framework on the decision-making process.
Id. at 40.
41 See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1055(b)(iv)(B) (McKinney 2002) (list of
relevant factors); MINN. STAT. § 260C.212 subd. 2(b) (2003) (list of different types of
placements in order of preference).
46 Although not officially binding as treaty law, the norms set forth by the
UDHR have become universal state practice and enjoy wide opinio juris. As such, the
provisions of the UDHR are enforceable as customary rules of international law. In
addition to obtaining the status of customary law, many of the norms contained in the
UDHR have been reproduced in various treaties. See generally Anne F. Bayefsky, The
Legacy of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 5 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 261
(1999).
, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., U.N. Doc A/810 (1948), arts. 12, 16.
41 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, arts. 12, 23.
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Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights
(European Convention) states that "everyone has the right to
respect for his private and family life .... There shall be no
interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right
except such as in accordance with the law and as is necessary
in a democratic society . . ."" Article 17 of the American
Convention on Human Rights declares the family is "the
natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled
to protection by society and the state."' Article 18 of the
African Charter on Human and People's Rights states that the
family is "the natural unit and basis of society," to be
"protected by the State which shall take care of its physical
health and moral.""
A number of courts, including international tribunals,
have produced a line of cases protecting family unity." The
European Court of Human Rights, the body responsible for
implementing the European Convention, in particular has
issued a rich amount of case law favoring family unity.'
2. Parental Rights - The Traditional Domestic
Principle
Although internationally not recognized as an operative
principle, parental rights are an important consideration in
many domestic jurisdictions. Indeed, in the past, the rights of a
parent were the only salient consideration.' Any arguments
based on the welfare of a child were actually rooted in a
" European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, art. 8.
' American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123,
art. 17(1).
'1 African Charter on Human and People's Rights, June 26, 1981, 21 I.L.M.
59, art. 18(1).
" See, e.g., Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Ah Hin Teoh,
(1995) 183 C.L.R. 273 (Austl.) (reversing deportation order of Malaysian citizen even
though he had committed crime because negative impact his absence would have on his
children, citing Convention on the Rights of Child); Berrehab v. Netherlands, 138 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988) (finding deportation of native Moroccan was violation of right to
respect for family life because deportee had resided lawfully in the Netherlands for
years and had real family ties there, including a daughter); Moustaquim v. Belgium,
193 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1991) (finding deportation of native Moroccan was violation
of right to respect for family life because court failed to consider fact that deportee's
close relatives lived in Belgium).
Giovanna I. Wolf, Preserving Family Unity: The Rights of Children to
Maintain the Companionship of Their Parents and Remain in Their Country of Birth, 4
IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STuD. 207, 211-13 (1996).
" Rochelle D. Jackson, The War Over Children's Rights: And Justice for All?
Equalizing the Rights of Children, 4 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 223, 230-33 (1999).
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parent's entitlement to custody, control, and protection."
Parents were entitled to protection of their children just as
they were entitled to protection of their property." A child's
interests received protection only so far as that protection
would promote the parents' interests. In light of the global
trend to recognize children as individuals rather than chattel,
the old derivative view of children's rights has understandably
waned. Children now possess rights of their own. 7 However,
parental rights have not completely disappeared. A parent's
rights will be trumped only in the event that they clearly
conflict with a child's best interests.' Otherwise, parental
rights can factor very strongly into child welfare decisions."
The United States affords strong protection to parents.'
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that its decisions have
made it clear "beyond the need for multiple citation that a
parent's desire for and right to 'the companionship, care,
custody and management of his or her children' is an important
interest that 'undeniably warrants deference and, absent a
powerful countervailing interest, protection.'6 1 The Supreme
Court recognizes broad parental authority over children as a
constitutional right grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment
Id.
56Id.
17 Id. at 236. See also Tropea v. Tropea (In re Tropea), 665 N.E.2d 145 (N.Y.
1996) ("Children are not chattel, and custody and visitation decisions should be made
with a view toward what best serves their interests ....").
" For example, a child is not entitled to be removed and placed into another
family just because the new family will provide him a better upbringing. See Griggs v.
Barnes, 78 So. 2d 910 (Ala. 1955):
While it is true that the 'pole star' in custody cases is the best interest and
welfare of the child, the courts of this state do not have the power to sever the
bonds of a blood relationship merely in order to gain some real or fancied
advantage for a minor child.
Id. at 914; In re Kiugman, 97 N.W.2d 425, 429-30 (Minn. 1959) ("'best interests' does
not mean that the child may have an easier or more luxurious life and greater prospect
of inheritance with others than with the natural parents").
" In fact, the default position when there has been no court involvement is to
allow parental rights to trump a child's best interests. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292,
303-04 (1993) (finding that when a parent already has legal custody, best interests is
not the standard, but, rather, "[slo long as certain minimum requirements of child care
are met, the interests of the child may be subordinated to interests of other children or
indeed even to interests of the parents or guardians themselves").
60 Jackson, supra note 54, at 234-35.
1 Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (quoting Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)). See also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 56 (2000)
(holding that an open ended statutory provision allowing visitation by any interested
person was violation of parental rights); M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) (holding
that indigent parent cannot be required to pay court fees to appeal the termination of
parental rights).
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due process guarantee. 2 As such, the parental right to the
custody and control of a child is a fundamental liberty
interest.'
III. FINDING A LEGAL BASIS FOR ASSERTING AN OBLIGATION
An examination of international and domestic law
reveals a preference for children to be in the custody of a
parent or relative. As expected, that preference is notably less
strong with respect to non-parent relatives. But, all other
things being equal, relatives are universally favored over
strangers or institutional care. Principles that favor placement
with persons of the same nationality or cultural background
further support a preference for placement with relatives.
Overall, these preferences provide a strong legal basis for
imposing an obligation on child welfare officials to return a
dependent child to parents or relatives.'
The following sections examine how a preference for
reunification with parents and placement with relatives is
derived from the three general principles described above -
best interests, familial integrity, and parental rights. This
examination is followed by a discussion about the distinction
between preferences and obligations and why this makes a
difference in the context of child protection.
A. Reunification with a Parent
1. International Law
International law views children as best off with their
natural parents. 5 Resolution 41/85 states that the "first
priority for a child is to be cared for by his or her own
parents."' The CRC asserts that nations "shall ensure that a
child shall not be separated from his or her parents against
their will, except when competent authorities subject to judicial
62 Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255-56 (1978).
' Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (defining a parent's right in
care, custody and management of their children as a fundamental liberty interest).
64 This preference would nevertheless have to fall in those situations where
there is evidence that reunification or placement would be against the child's best
interests.
. See generally Alexandra Maravel, Intercountry Adoption and the Flight
From Unwed Fathers' Rights: Whose Right is it Anyway?, 48 S.C. L. REV. 497, 561-68
(1996).
' U.N. Resolution 41/85, supra note 34, art.3.
[Vol. 69:41528
2004] MAKING SURE CHILDREN FIND THEIR WAY HOME
review determine, in accordance with applicable law and
procedures, that such separation is necessary for the best
interests of the child."67 Governments must exercise a policy of
non-interference unless they can prove that a child's welfare is
endangered. This means that a child cannot be removed from
her parents simply because child welfare officials think the
child will be better off under someone else's care. The child
must be at a risk of harm before the state can take the child
away from her parents. Nations must acknowledge and respect
that children have a protectable right in remaining in the
custody of their parents.
Likewise, after the state has separated a family, the
state is obligated to continue to respect the relationship
between parent and child. The CRC recognizes a child's right to
maintain contact with parents after separation, as well as a
parent's right to participate and be heard in court
proceedings.' Most importantly, international law imposes a
duty on the state to assist separated families. The
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights calls for the "widest possible protection and assistance"
to be accorded to the family and stresses that the state must
adhere to this duty particularly "while it is responsible for the
care and education of dependent children."9 The Hague
Convention of Children and Cooperation in Respect of
Intercountry Adoption (Hague Adoption Convention) instructs
that "each State should take, as a matter of priority,
appropriate measures to enable the child to remain in the care
of his or her family of origin."" In the context of abuse and
neglect cases, this means that before the state can offer a
dependent child for adoption, states must work with the family
to resolve and cure the initial problem that justified the
removal of the child.
" Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N.
GAOR, 44th Sess., art. 9(1).
Id. art. 9(3) ("State Parties shall respect the right of the child who is
separated from one or both parents to maintain personal relations and direct contact
with both parents on a regular basis, except if it is contrary to the child's best
interests."); id. art. 9(2) ("In any proceedings [to remove a child from his or her
parents], all interested parties shall be given an opportunity to participate in the
proceedings and make their views known.").
" International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16,
1996, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 10.
70 Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect
of Intercountry Adoption, May 29, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1134, pmbl.
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2. Domestic Law
Domestic law also protects the parent-child relationship
and urges the state to restore the family. Unlike international
law, which derives the priority of reunification from the rights
of child and family, domestic law tends to recognize the priority
of reunification as a natural extension of a parent's widely
recognized right in custody of their own child.7 Removing a
child from a parent is understood as only a temporary measure
while the state works with the parent toward reunification."
American law recognizes that "a child's best interests are
presumptively served by being with a parent, provided that the
parent is not unfit."" The U.S. Supreme Court established the
relatively high standard of clear and convincing evidence in
proceedings involving the permanent removal of a child from
her family. 4 The Court has held that a parent's fundamental
liberty interest "does not evaporate simply because they have
not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their
child to the State."7
In some jurisdictions in the United States, state law
contains explicit language establishing an obligation to reunify.
Most states require child welfare agencies to exercise some
qualified effort in attempting to return a child to her family.7
7' See In re D.T., 491 A.2d 7, 10 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985).
See In re Hastings, 318 N.W.2d 80, 87 (Neb. 1982); In re Deborah S., 453
N.Y.S. 2d 1007, 1008 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1982).
73 In re S.G., 581 A.2d 771, 785 (D.C.1990).
71 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747 (1982) ("Before a State may sever
completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due process
requires that the State support its allegations by at least clear and convincing
evidence.").
75 Id. at 745; 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parent and Child § 38 (2004).
76 See, e.g., In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 736 A.2d 1246, 1255 (N.J. 1999)
(noting that "best interests standard requires [State] to undertake diligent efforts to
reunite the family," a standard which "contemplates efforts that focus on reunification
of the parent with the child and assistance to the parent to correct and overcome those
circumstances that necessitated the placement of the child into foster care");
Champagne v. Welfare Div. of Nevada Dept. of Human Resources, 691 P.2d 849 (Nev.
1984); In re Brianna D., 798 A.2d 413 (R.I. 2002); In re Star Leslie W., 470 N.E.2d 824
(N.Y. 1984).
[B]efore terminating a parent's rights the State must first attempt to reunite
the parent with her child . . . efforts must include counseling, making
suitable arrangements for visitation, providing assistance to the parents to
resolve or ameliorate the problems preventing discharge of the child to their
care and advising the parent at appropriate intervals of the child's progress
and development....
In re Star Leslie W., 470 N.E.2d at 827.
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In most cases, minimal or token efforts are not acceptable; they
must be diligent or reasonable.77
In addition to these safeguards, domestic law also
provides a right of visitation."8 Visitation between a removed
child and the parent is a crucial step in the process of
reunification, both legally and psychologically." Observation by
child welfare officials during visits between child and parent
can serve as a useful source of evidence in determining
whether the child should be returned to the parent.' Visits also
serve as an important transitional aid, emotionally preparing
both parent and child for living together again. Visits are thus
a key tool in working toward successful reunification.8 ' The
prevalence of visitation rights in the United States reflects the
nation's dedication to the goal of returning a child to a
respondent parent.
B. Placement with a Relative
1. International Law
After reunification with parents, international law
recognizes placement with a relative as a priority. U.N.
Resolution 41/85 states, "When care by the child's own parents
is unavailable or inappropriate, care by relatives of the child's
parents, by another substitute - foster or adoptive - family or,
if necessary, by an appropriate institution should be
considered."" This resolution points out various options when a
child's parents cannot be caregivers. It first mentions relatives,
then other families, and lastly institutions. Because
institutional care is unambiguously a less ideal environment
" See, e.g., Star Leslie W., 470 N.E.2d at 827. Minnesota defines "reasonable
efforts" as:
the exercise of due diligence by the responsible social services agency to use
appropriate and available services to meet the needs of the child and the
child's family in order to prevent removal of the child from the child's family;
or upon removal, services to eliminate the need for removal and reunite the
family.
MINN. STAT. 260.012(b) (2003).
78 See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1081 (McKinney 2004).
78 See Visitation and Concurrent Planning, CHILDREN'S SERVICES PRACTICE
NoTEs (Oct. 2000), available at http://sswnt7.sowo.unc.edu/fcrp/Cspn/Vol5-no4/
visitation_concurrent-planning.htm.
'0 See id.
81 See id.
8 U.N. Resolution 41/85, supra note 34, art.4.
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for children' and because there is a preference for keeping a
child with "his family" and in his country and culture of
origin,' the most reasonable interpretation of this provision is
as a prioritized list of options, ranging from the most to the
least preferred.
When a viable relative has stepped up and is willing to
care for a child, or when such a relative can be easily located
and is willing to explore placement, international law should be
interpreted to generally favor placement with relatives since
the other options are less ideal. Introduction into a new family,
especially when the members of that family are strangers who
may not have the same religious, cultural, or ethnic
background as the child, can subject a child to a psychologically
burdensome transition that could easily be avoided by
placement with relatives.
Even less ideal is placement in a group home or
institution. Institutional homes are, at least in the United
States, notoriously places where children with various
problems end up. Instead of being therapeutic, often these
homes are breeding grounds for the development of more
complex and severe problems. Even though international law
does not explicitly state a preference for placement with
relatives over institutions and other families, a best interests
argument supports such a preference, which is strengthened by
0 One commentator noted the following about group homes:
Unlike foster homes, there is no pretense that [a] group home will be like a
family. There are no parents; youth are responsible to attend school or work,
meet with their social workers, and prepare for life on their own after they
reach the age of majority. Youth from various backgrounds with different
reasons for being in state custody find themselves thrown together with
limited supervision. This lack of supervision can result in the laws of the
streets being played out within the state-sponsored facilities.
Miriam Aviva Friedland, Too Close to the Edge: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and
Transgender Youth in the Child Welfare System, 3 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 777 (2002). An
organization called "Lifting the Veil" conducted research on group homes and published
a scathing report, which included the following criticisms:
A longtime foster care licensing official . . . maintained that the group home
system is still tainted by providers who enrich themselves and by regulators
incapable of stopping them .... Children are placed for inappropriately long
and arbitrarily determined periods of time. Little or no work is done to return
children to their families. Most programs consider home visits to be a
privilege, and visits are used as rewards for good behavior rather than as
reunification tools .... Staffing continues to be a problem in these facilities.
Many group home owners pay minimum wage, or slightly above, and
turnover remains high, just as it does in the rest of the child welfare
industry.
Lifting the Veil, A Critical Look at the Foster Care System: The Group Homes, at
httpJ/www.liftingtheveil.org/foster09.htm (last visited Aug. 26, 2004).
' See infra Part III.C.
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both domestic practice and the internationally recognized
principles of parental and cultural preferences.
2. Domestic Law
Most jurisdictions within the United States establish a
clear preference for kinship placements.' For example, the
California Family Code declares that "[p]lacement shall, if
possible, be made in the home of a relative" and that "[dliligent
efforts shall be made to locate an appropriate relative."88 The
Connecticut Supreme Court has ruled that the state may not
offer a child for adoption until it shows that there are no
available relatives." Furthermore, a New Jersey court has
stated that a strong family affiliation is a crucial factor in
determining custody.8 Still, a few states are more reserved in
declaring that relatives have preference in custody decisions.
New York courts have even gone as far as holding that being a
relative receives no precedence in adoption proceedings..8 At the
same time, though, the New York State Family Court Act
orders its social service agencies, after a child is removed from
her home, to "conduct an immediate investigation to locate
relatives of the child and inform them of the pendency of the
proceeding and of the procedures for becoming foster parents or
for seeking custody or care of the child."' Statistics suggest
that New York courts commonly place children with non-
relatives." In practice, states that don't give preference to
relatives are a minority. In determining who should have
custody of the infant, a relative of the child will usually be
preferred over a stranger."
See, e.g., In re M.M., 452 N.w.2d 236, 238 (Minn. 1990) ("Today there
remains a strong preference to award the permanent care and custody of a child to a
relative if either or both of the natural parents are unable to perform that
responsibility."); In re Cooper, 410 P.2d 475, 476 (Utah 1966) ("all things else being
equal, near relatives should generally be given preference over nonrelatives").
8 CAL. FAM. CODE § 7950 (2004).
17 In re Theresa S., 491 A.2d 355, 362 (Conn. 1985).
S.M. v. A.W., 656 A.2d 841,844-45 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995).
In re D. Children, 576 N.Y.S.2d 136, 137 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991); In re Netfa
P., 496 N.Y.S.2d 21 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).N.Y. FAm. CT. ACT § 1017 (McKinney 2004).
81 Jill Duer Berrick, When Children Cannot Remain Home: Foster Family
Care and Kinship Care, at 74 (Spring 1998), available at
http://www.futureofchildren.org usr_doc/vol8nolART5.pdf.
Randi Mandelbaum, Trying to Fit Square Pegs into Round Holes: The Needfor a New Funding Scheme for Kinship Caregivers, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 907, 928
(1995) ("In 1992, twenty-nine states had policies that required child welfare workers to
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While parents often successfully claim an entitlement to
custody, relatives claiming custodial rights are markedly less
successful. In fact, domestic law in some countries refuses to
acknowledge that a relative has any right with respect to a
child.93 This, however, does not preclude the assertion of an
obligation to place a child with a relative as a priority over non-
relatives. Instead of making reference to a relative's right to
custody, the obligation should be premised on the child's
welfare. A relative must argue that custody should be granted
as a matter of the child's best interests or maybe even perhaps
on the basis of a parent's wishes for the child to be with a
relative."
C. Preserving Culture and Nationality
In general, the argument for asserting an obligation on
states to place children with relatives is much weaker than for
asserting an obligation to place children with parents. Other
considerations that might aid in asserting an obligation with
respect to relatives include the generally accepted principles of
preserving a child's connection to his or her culture and
nationality.
1. International Law
The importance of keeping a child in a culturally similar
environment has been recognized on the international level.
The CRC says that "due regard shall be paid to the desirability
of continuity in a child's upbringing and to the child's ethnic,
religious, cultural and linguistic background." 5 The CRC also
asserts that inter-country adoption may be considered as an
give preference to relatives as foster care providers for their kin. Another fifteen states
placed children with relatives routinely.").
"' See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (refusing to grant custody
rights to grandparents); L.H. v. Youth Welfare Office of Wiesbaden, Germany, 568
N.Y.S.2d 852 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1991) (noting that Germany refused to grant visitation
rights to grandparents and eventually even to parent).
' Even after a determination of abuse or neglect, courts often recognize that
parents are in a unique position to understand what's best for their child. Some states
recognize that parents have a right to speak and have their opinions heard with
respect to what is in their child's best interests, even though they have been
disqualified from obtaining custody. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111(3)(b)
(McKinney 2002) (granting fathers who have no cognizable custodial claim the right to
be sent notice regarding dispositional hearing where best interests of child will be
determined, as well as the right to be heard at such hearing).
" Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N.
GAOR, 44th Sess., art. 20(3).
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alternative means to caring for a child only when the child
cannot in any suitable manner be cared for in her country of
origin.' The Hague Adoption Convention similarly states that
"intercountry adoption may offer the advantage of a permanent
family to a child for whom a suitable family cannot be found in
his or her State of origin."97
2. Domestic Law
In the past, the law and practice of most U.S.
jurisdictions demonstrated a preference for culturally similar
placements, but recently these policies have faced considerable
constitutional challenge. The cultural preference has been
construed in many jurisdictions as a racial classification. Upon
challenge, some of these racial classifications have failed to
meet strict scrutiny and thus been declared unconstitutional.
For example, a Minnesota law previously required courts to
consider a child's race and ethnicity.' The law stated that if a
relative could not be found, the next preference was to find a
person with a similar background.' Only a revised law that
limited its preference to families of the same religion survived
constitutional challenge."n Along that line, Texas law
specifically prohibits placements based on racial preference.1
California previously permitted consideration by courts
of the racial background of a potential caregiver, as long as it
did not amount to a categorical denial based on race, color, or
natural origin. In 2003, the law was rephrased in solely
prohibitive, rather than permissive, terms, simply stating that
the state may not "[dielay or deny the placement of a child into
Id. art. 21(b). Although this rule argues for keeping a child in a country
and this Note conversely tries to break down barriers preventing a child from being
placed abroad, the rule nevertheless stands for the general principle that placing a
child in his country of origin (regardless of where that child currently is located) is a
priority.
Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect
of Intercountry Adoption, May 29, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1134, pmbl.
98 See In re H.L.K., No. C4-98-2353, 1999 Minn. App. LEXIS 673 (Minn. Ct.
App. June 15, 1999).
9 See id.
10. MINN. STAT. § 259.29 (2003).
101 TEXAS FAM. CODE ANN. § 162.308(a) (Vernon 2004) (A state agent "may not
make an adoption placement decision on the presumption that placing a child in a
family of the same race or ethnicity as the race or ethnicity of the child is in the best
interest of the child.").
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foster care on the basis of the race, color, or national origin of
the foster parent or the child involved."'"
D. Asserting an Obligation
Internationally and domestically, the prevalent rule of
law holds that placing a child with parents or relatives is
generally in the child's best interests and is preferred over
placement with a new family or institution. This seemingly
implies that child welfare officials are under an obligation to
first pursue placement with a parent or relative until it is
evident that doing so would not serve the child's best interests.
However, the existence of a preference for placing children with
parents or relatives does not necessarily translate into an
obligation on child welfare officials to work toward that goal.
The express imposition of such an obligation is the next logical
step in making certain the preference is implemented and
legally enforced.
An obligation for states to attempt to place children
with parents or relatives abroad does not replace or stand in
conflict with the best interests standard. Rather, it is a sub-
principle that gives contour and substance to the general
principle of best interests. The obligation is a guideline
defining the general conditions that best maximize child
welfare. Asserting an obligation does not mean that
reunification or placement ought to be the only purpose and
concern of the state or that it should be pursued no matter how
high the cost. There are many legitimate factors that can
override the priority of reunification with a parent or
placement with a relative. For example, placement with a
relative living far away may be less viable the older the child
gets and the more socially connected a child becomes to her
current home. Another possible overriding factor may be a lack
of cooperation by the parent or relative desiring custody. What
this Note argues is that a state must consider reunification or
relative placement as the first option for any dependent child
because it is presumably in the child's best interests to be
raised that way.
An example of case law supporting this position is In re
M.M.'°3 After declaring M.M. a dependent child, the Minnesota
Supreme Court acknowledged that it would be best to place the
'02 CAL. FAM. CODE § 7950 & note on 2003 amend. (Deering 2004).
103 452 N.W.2d 236 (Minn. 1990).
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child with the grandmother, noting the statutory preference for
relatives.' The court then derived an obligation from that
preference."' The court held that before the child welfare
agency could disregard the preference and work toward
placement with another individual, it was required to
demonstrate that giving custody to the grandmother would
have a negative or detrimental effect on the child."'
Most states recognize this obligation in one form or
another when working with children and parental resources
located within the same jurisdiction, as reflected in the
preceding analysis. However, the obligation is quickly
disregarded when the parental resource resides outside the
jurisdiction.
IV. ASSERTING AN OBLIGATION EVEN WHEN THE PARENTAL
RESOURCE LivEs ABROAD
Unless there are strong arguments showing that such a
placement is practically impossible, a child whose parental
resources are located abroad is just as entitled as every other
child to be reunited with his or her family.
The California Supreme Court is one of the first courts
to recognize an obligation in the special circumstances of a
parental resource living abroad. The court decided in In re B.G.
that a child welfare agency had failed to exercise reasonable
efforts to return a child to his birth mother who resided in the
Czech Republic. °7 While it acknowledged the complicating
factors that her residence in another country presented, as well
as how those complications may affect the child, the court
afforded substantial weight to the fact that the petitioner was
the natural mother and ordered the agency to work towards
reunification." The court held that this preference was
enforceable as a matter of both the mother's and the child's
rights.'
Nonetheless, other jurisdictions are slow to recognize
this obligation as an affirmative and enforceable duty. Without
specific instructions to do otherwise, child welfare officials may
avoid the added responsibility of working toward a placement
'" Id. at 238.
".. Id. at 239.
10" Id.
107 523 P.2d 244 (Cal. 1974).
10 Id.
109 Id.
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in a foreign country because it requires significant resources
and because they may feel that they can justify a decision not
to pursue foreign placement in terms of the child's welfare.
Claims that relocation will psychologically harm the child
inevitably arise. Agencies may also exploit linguistic and
cultural barriers to justify not working toward a foreign
placement.
In most cases, these reasons are not good enough. Few
excuses should weigh heavily enough to negate a state's
obligation to respect a family's right to remain together, a
child's right to be raised by her own parents or relatives, and a
parent's right to custody.
A. State Burden
The main argument against asserting such an
obligation appeals to the state's interests in avoiding the extra
burdens involved with placing a child in another country. Local
caseworkers are not trained to coordinate on the international
level. International placements can involve considerable
communication barriers. The information necessary to
ascertain the fitness of parental resources is much more
difficult to obtain and even more difficult to certify. Moreover
and usually most relevantly, the financial costs of international
placement are likely to be much higher than the costs
associated with local cases.
The argument that the burden on a state may displace
its obligation to reunite children with their families fails,
however, because it disregards the best interests of the child.
Moreover, countries spend a lot of time and money on
reunification services for parents locally, especially when a
respondent parent requires intensive psychological or medical
services, such as drug rehabilitation. There are very few
circumstances that would justify a state's interests overriding
both the welfare rights of a child and the custodial rights of
parents and relatives.
Granted, the state cannot be expected to run itself into
bankruptcy in an effort to meet its obligations. There must be
some limits. Qualification of the obligation is necessary. The
U.S. federal government, for example, conditions the grant of
federal funds for foster care to states on a showing that welfare
agencies have made "reasonable efforts" to return removed
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children to their families."' The obligation in the United States,
both on the federal and state level, is usually qualified in terms
of a requirement to exercise "diligent" or "reasonable" efforts.
By qualifying the obligation in such a way, the statutes make
sure that child welfare officials pursue reunification in good
faith while protecting the interests of a state to make sure it is
not overburdened.
B. Competing Best Interests Arguments
An alternative argument against an obligation couches
the complications of placement abroad in terms of the child's
best interests rather than in terms of a burden the state will
face. It is much easier to construct a best interests justification
against reunification when the parent or relative is located
abroad. The complexity involved in coordinating an
international placement will be interpreted as an indication
that such a placement is unrealistic and thus not in the best
interests of the child. However, difficulties entailed by a
process do not necessarily mean that the process should be
abandoned. Nevertheless, because of the wide discretion they
are granted, family court judges may freely exploit the
flexibility inherent in the best interests calculus to justify
keeping a child in their jurisdiction."' Such justifications rely
on the potential negative effects placement abroad may have on
the child, including a delay in permanence; psychological harm
incurred in adjustment; lack of a bond with the relative or
parent abroad; and relocation to an economically, culturally, or
socially inferior country. In the end, these factors might very
well override a preference for placing a child with a parent or
relative, but decision makers must not preclude the option of
placement abroad. They must objectively evaluate all factors
' See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B) (2000). See also supra notes 76-77 and
accompanying text. Minnesota further qualifies its reasonable efforts standard to
include consideration of the state's limits in certain circumstances. "When determining
whether reasonable efforts have been made, the court shall consider whether services
to the child and family were . . . realistic under the circumstance." MINN. STAT.
260.012(c)(6) (2003).
.. See Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 45 n.13 (1981) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) (arguing that the best interests standard, which offers little guidance,
encourages judges to rely on their own personal values); Timothy E. Lin, Social Norms
And Judicial Decisionmaking: Examining The Role Of Narratives In Same-Sex
Adoption Cases, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 739, 770 ("The lack of quantifiable, objective
standards in the child placement field exacerbates the problems created by wide
judicial discretion by opening the door for personal prejudices to enter into the
analysis.").
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and properly assign preference to parents and relatives, even if
they may have to dedicate more resources to work with a
distant parental resource.
Of course, the above factors can be manipulated to
achieve a contrary result. For example, the goal of achieving
permanence for a child will sometimes be in tension with the
goal of foreign placement. The push for permanency aims at
getting a child in a stable and permanent home environment as
soon as possible. If it would take four years to rehabilitate and
reunify parent and child, but it would only take no more than a
year for a new family to adopt that child, permanency dictates
that the child should be adopted. Many jurisdictions accord the
factor of permanency significant weight.11
A child welfare agency could argue that a foreign
placement would take too much time and result in the child's
prolonged stay in foster care. In addition to the psychological
hardship this may impose, the agency would argue that
pursuing a foreign placement deprives the child of stability.
The agency would argue that permanence could be achieved
much sooner if the child were adopted by a local family.
However, freeing a child for adoption does not always
achieve permanence. Depending on the age and the mental and
physical health of the child, finding a suitable adoptive
placement could take just as long or even longer than it would
take to place the child with a willing relative abroad. ' In the
meantime, a child could languish in foster care, knowing that
there is a relative willing to take care of him and suffering at
the thought that child welfare officials think it better to keep
him in an institution or with strangers. Moreover, child welfare
officials do not know how long and difficult the process of
placement abroad will take until they attempt it. Delay cannot
be used as an excuse before efforts to act on the obligation have
112 United States federal law calls for states to seek permanence. The
Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA), Pub L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115
(1997), imposes strict time constraints, requiring states to develop permanency plans
and pursue those plans so as to minimize the amount of time that a dependent child
remains in foster care. See also infra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
13 Older and handicapped children are often considered undesirable
candidates for adoption and many of these children will never leave the foster care
system. See William Wesley Patton, The World Where Parallel Lines Converge: The
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Concurrent Civil and Criminal Child Abuse
Proceedings, 24 GA. L. REV. 473, 490 n.64 (1990) ("[Tihere is a rapidly growing number
of hard-to-place children who will probably spend the rest of their childhood without a
permanent home; minority, older and handicapped children are very unlikely to be
adopted."); Lin, supra note 111, at 771.
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even begun. If the parental resource is cooperative and the
receiving state has a system that can provide the various
information and services that are required, such as approval of
the home and transitional visits, the process could be
completed relatively quickly. Also, the length of the process
could be greatly reduced when a proper mechanism to facilitate
international placements exists in both the sending and
receiving countries."' Furthermore, an obligation to pursue
placement with a parent or relative does not preclude child
welfare officials from concurrently working on an alternative
solution such as local adoption. "5
United States federal law mandates that a child's
custody status cannot remain needlessly in limbo without end.
The Federal American Safe Families Act requires states to
initiate proceedings to free a child for adoption if he or she has
been in state care for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two
months."' In combination with requirements to exercise efforts
to reunify, this law forces child welfare officials to work toward
permanence quickly and in good faith. These statutorily
imposed timeframes should be the ultimate judge of whether
local adoption or placement abroad with relatives is the best
way to give a child the permanence she needs, rather than an
appeal to preconceptions about the impropriety of foreign
placement and speculation about how long such a placement
would take.
Apart from permanence, the psychological harm that
children may face in relocating, including adjustment to a new
caregiver and a new culture, is a valid concern." If child
welfare officials present evidence by a licensed physician or
psychiatrist that show the child will be traumatized by a move
to another country, child welfare officials should first explore
whether therapy can prepare the child for adjustment and
minimize the harm. In the case where placement would cause
114 See infra Part VI.
"' ASFA allows states to implement "concurrent planning" in which child
welfare agencies pursue both reunification and adoption at the same time. 42 U.S.C. §
671 (2000). See Susan L. Brooks & Dorothy E. Roberts, Social Justice and Family
Court Reform, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 453, 454 (2002).
16 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) (2000).
"7 See generally Jan Linowitz & Neil Boothby, Cross-cultural Placements, in
UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN: CARE AND PROTECTION IN WARS, NATURAL DISASTERS,
AND REFUGEE MOVEMENTS (Everett M. Ressler et al. eds., 1988); William G. Austin, A
Forensic Psychology Model of Risk Assessment for Child Custody Relocation Law, 38
FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 192, 197 (2000) ('relocation is a general risk factor for
child psychopathology and adjustment").
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clear and imminent debilitating harm, child welfare officials
should rightly forgo any plan to place the child abroad.
However, this option should only prevail when there is a clear
showing of potential harm. A blanket general principle
concluding that placement abroad psychologically harms
children is unwarranted. Decision makers must look at the
facts of each case, particularly the psychological health of the
child, and make a reasoned determination regarding the risk of
harm that relocation imposes. Psychiatric and legal expertise
on this subject has developed enough so that courts possess the
tools necessary to make informed determinations.'18 While
relocation is a risk factor, some children may be extremely
resilient and able to adapt to their new language and culture.
In opposing an obligation, child welfare officials may
also point to the child's lack of a bond with the distantly located
parental resource as well as the conversely strong bond
between child and foster parent."9  The strongest
counterargument is that the lack of a bond between a child and
a relative abroad often results from the child welfare system's
resistance and delay in reuniting them. Because child welfare
officials are so slow or unable to act upon the very obligation
proposed in this Note, children end up remaining in care long
enough to form bonds with other individuals. Allowing the
symptom of a problem to justify the problem's continuation is
nothing more than a circular and self-defeating argument.
While the presence of a bond with a new caregiver may be used
in a particularly compelling case to oppose reunification with a
parent or relative,'' it cannot be used as a general reason to
oppose creating the obligation described above.''
"' While most of this work has been done in the context of relocation by a
custodial parent subsequent to a divorce, the research is comparable and useful in
making decisions about relocating dependent child. See, e.g., Austin, supra note 117, at
199-203 (providing a framework from which family court judges can assess risk of
harm caused by relocation).
".. See, e.g., In re DMH, 736 A.2d 1261, 1271 (N.J. 1999) (according significant
weight to the strong bond that existed between foster parent and child in denying
reunification services and terminating parental rights).
" See, e.g., In re Jasmon 0., 878 P.2d 1297, 1305 (Cal. 1994) (affirming
termination of father's rights where child developed a mental illness because of visits
with father and separation from her foster parents); McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 693 F.
Supp. 318, 327 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (requiring return of child to foster parents where child
had developed severe depression as a result of being removed from foster home).
"' See Smith v. Foster Families For Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 842-
47 (1977) (finding that bond with foster parent does not enjoy same protections as
bonds within natural families since foster parents do not have justifiable expectations
of an enduring companionship with their foster children because their emotional ties
originate under state law).
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Still, others may argue that placement abroad is not in
the best interests of the child because social conditions in the
child's current country of residence are better than social
conditions in the country where the parent or relative resides.
This position may seem biased and over-generalized, but the
argument has been used many times before and it is most
compelling when the difference between the two countries is
stark.2 ' However, these considerations should rarely, if ever, be
relevant in determining the custody of dependent children.
"Juvenile dependency law does not codify the dominant culture
or the regnant political system.""2 3 Just because a parent is
located in a third-world country does not mean that parent will
give third-world care. Any concerns an agency has about a
placement abroad should be brought out only by reference to
specific evidence regarding the parental resource's fitness as a
guardian instead of through broad conclusions about the
desirability of being raised in one country as opposed to
another. The focus must be on whether the specific parental
resource can assure the child will grow up in an adequate
environment. Statistics about the general population only offer
unwarranted generalizations about what kind of parent the
relative or parent living abroad must be.
As noted before, best interests arguments are not a
precise science.'24 Many factors, often of unspecified weight,
must be considered and balanced against each other. One
might easily manipulate the above factors within the best
122 The most infamous case is that of Elian Gonzalez, where Elian's Uncle
petitioned on behalf of the Cuban-born child for asylum on the ground that the child's
best interests would not be served by being forced to go back to live in Cuba where he
would be persecuted and used as a propaganda tool for the communist government.
Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2000). See also Nahid H. v. Sacramento Cty.
Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 281, 294 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)
(criticizing social worker who "reflexively conclude[d] the best interests of the minors
[could] be served only within the cultural milieu of this society and the political system
of this jurisdiction").
National bias may also motivate a judge's decision regarding a child's best
interests.... Sweden is among the least compliant. Swedish courts favor...
Swedes to non-Swedes through employment of the subjective best interest
standard. Germany has also been accused of favoring the custody
applications of its own citizens. The best interest standard allows biases to
impede the rightful return of children.
Marisa Leto, Whose Best Interest? International Child Abduction Under the Hague
Convention, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 247, 252-53 (2002).
12' Nahid H., 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 294.
... MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC
AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM 107 (1991) (describing best interests standard as
.amorphous, undirected, incomprehensible and indeterminate").
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interests framework to shirk the obligation to return a child to
a relative or parent, especially when they are located abroad.
The state cannot say that it will try hard in some cases to
reunify a child with a parent, but not in others. Allowing a
transnational barrier to extinguish this obligation is not only
inequitable, it often proves to be arbitrary. Returning a child
living in California to grandparents in Mexico may be faster
and less expensive than returning a child living in Florida to
grandparents in Oregon. Family courts and child welfare
officials should not rule out the possibility that placement
abroad with a parental resource may be the option that best
maximizes a child's well-being.'" A child is entitled to have her
best interests protected to the same extent in every situation.
V. CODIFICATION
A. The Need for Explicit Codification
International law contains a parental and relative
preference, but there are no instruments of international law
that unambiguously declare that these preferences call for a
legally binding obligation on state welfare officials to exercise
efforts to place children with parents or relatives regardless of
their residence. Simple reliance on the parental and relative
preferences, without having a specific provision asserting an
obligation, leaves too much room for interpretation. As noted
above, arguments against an obligation are easy to construct by
manipulating the many other factors relevant to best interests.
Specific codification, on the other hand, would be unambiguous
and would compel child welfare officials to establish policies
and procedures to discharge the duty specifically assigned to
them. Under this framework, child welfare officials must show
they reasonably tried to place a child with a parent or relative
before the child can be freed for adoption or allowed to remain
in long term foster care.
The obligation, in order to pass muster with both
legislators and the judiciary, must be expressed directly in
"2 Analogously, courts have held that relocation in the context of divorce must
not be ruled out as an option. See, e.g., Tropea v. Tropea (In re Tropea), 665 N.E.2d 145
(N.Y. 1996) (objecting to a "bright line" rule opposing relocation in all cases and instead
implementing a flexible fact-specific best interests test).
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terms of the child's best interests instead of the rights of a
parent, the family, or a relative.2 '
B. Resistance to Codification
Attempts to codify an obligation will face significant
resistance. Lawmakers are reluctant to codify principles that
give content to the best interests standard, even when they are
constructed in flexible terms. There is great debate about what
in fact is in the best interests of a child.'27 In addition, the
concept of best interests is difficult to pinpoint since every child
welfare case is different from the next.2' Courts would never
say that a child ought always to remain with her natural
parents, because there are clearly situations that warrant
denying parents custody, such as when the child is being
sexually abused or medically neglected by the parent seeking
custody.
A complete lack of guidelines to delineate the best
interests standard, though, can be a dangerous thing." People
have strong and varied opinions about what is in the best
interests of a child. There must be an objective bare minimum
that all people and cultures can agree upon. Without guiding
principles, the best interests concept is empty and untestable.
126 One English court explained how unconvincing and confusing arguments
based on a parent's rights can be:
[T]he description of those familial rights and privileges enjoyed by parents in
relation to their children as 'fundamental' or 'basic' does nothing, in my
judgment, to clarify either the nature or the extent of the concept which it is
sought to describe.... Whatever the position of the parent may be as a mat-
ter of law ... it is perfectly clear that any 'right' vested in him or her must
yield to the dictates of the welfare of the child.
Anne Bayefsky & Joan Fitzpatrick, International Human Rights Law in United
States Courts: A Comparative Perspective, 14 MICH. J. IN'L L. 1, 69-70 (1992)
(quoting In re KD., 2 W.L.R. 398 (H.L. 1988)).
127 Peggy C. Davis, Use and Abuse of the Power to Sever Family Bonds, 12
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 557, 559 (1984) (expressing doubt as to whether a judge
knows, or anyone knows, what precisely is in the best interests of a child).
" See Albert E. Hartmann, Crafting an Advocate for a Child: In Support of
Legislation Redefining the Role of the Guardian Ad Litem in Michigan Child Abuse and
Neglect Cases, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 237, 248 ("The best interests of the child client
are not easy to define. A determination of the child's best interests tends to be very fact
specific."); Donald N. Duquette & Sarah H. Ramsey, Representation of Children in
Child Abuse and Neglect Cases: An Empirical Look at What Constitutes Effective
Representation, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 341, 354-56 (1987) (admitting that best
interests standard is nebulous but attempting to identify generalized goals that tend to
maximize a child's welfare).
" See Jane S. Schacter, Constructing Families in a Democracy: Courts,
Legislatures and Second-Parent Adoption, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV 933, 943 (2000)
(describing best interests standard as a "license for crude bias").
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Unless there is a framework of principles defining what
generally is in the best interests of a child, those who make
crucial decisions regarding the fate of a dependent child
possess unfettered discretion.
There is a natural tension between the need to provide
principles specific enough to prevent discretionary abuse and
the opposing need to be flexible in dealing with the vast array
of different factual scenarios that may come up. Codifying
principles that flesh out the best interests standard must
therefore strike a fine balance. Codifying an obligation will
likely meet resistance if it imposes an overwhelmingly strong
and specified duty on child welfare officials. It cannot be so
stringent that it turns nations away from signature and
ratification, but it also must be strong enough to be effective.
C. Proposed Legislation
International lawmakers supporting an obligation must
carefully codify the obligation. They must find a way to be
precise enough to give the law some teeth. At the very least,
the obligation must be a duty to act (to pursue placement) and
not simply a duty to consider (assigning proper weight to the
preference). It must be incorporated into a child welfare
agency's protocol for every case it handles. It should specify
that once a child comes into state care, child welfare officials
must first consider placement with a parent or relative. If such
a placement is viable and not harmful to the child, the child
welfare agency must work diligently to pursue that goal. The
obligation must be just strong enough and just detailed enough
to compel child welfare officials to pursue placement even when
parents and relatives are abroad.
As a suggestion, this Note proposes language such as
the following:
As a guiding principle, it is generally in the best interests for a child
to be raised by a natural parent or close relative. As such, in matters
concerning the custody of dependent children, child welfare officials
are under an obligation to exercise reasonable efforts to locate,
contact, and work with a parent or close relative toward placement.
Child welfare officials should make reasonable efforts to place a child
with a parent or close relative in all situations, regardless of the
culture, jurisdiction, or residence of such parental resource. Since no
other concern can outweigh a child's best interests, this obligation
cannot be derogated so long as such placement is otherwise
determined to be in the best interests of the child.
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D. Properly Adhering to the Obligation
Any law that asserts this obligation must also specify
the conduct that satisfies the obligation. There is a danger that
child welfare agencies may simply transfer a child to the
parental resource without completing the same procedures it
would in a domestic case. Child welfare agencies cannot simply
transfer custody to a parental resource abroad the minute the
parental resource is located or once a determination has been
made that custody will inevitably be granted to the parent or
relevant abroad. The agency must exercise all of the same
caution that it would in a domestic case. 3' It must carefully
develop a reunification plan, which includes the services and
visitation schedule necessary to insure a healthy transition. It
must also assess the appropriateness of the home and the
fitness of the parental resource in order to make sure they can
provide adequate food, clothing, and shelter. If child welfare
officials fail to do this, the obligation will defeat the very
purpose it was meant to fulfill.
VI. ENACTMENT ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL
Imposing a legal obligation on the domestic level is not
enough. It must be established as part of international law.'
An internationally imposed obligation will have the most effect
on child welfare cases where the most effect is needed. It is
already common practice for most child welfare agencies to
0 Support for this rule can be implied from the CRC, which requires states to
ensure that a child being adopted internationally enjoys all of the same safeguards and
standards that a child being adopted locally would enjoy. Convention on the Rights of
the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., art. 2 1(c).
"' This Note asserts the importance of codifying the principle of parental and
relative preference regardless of geographic location into international law, but it does
not address how such a principle would be enforced. Enforcement of international law,
even with respect to the most widely accepted customary principles, is a complicated
and, some think, problematic issue. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW, intro. (1987) ("A principal weakness perceived in international law is the lack of
effective police authority to enforce it . . . but there are other inducements to
compliance .... [Liaw is observed because of a combination of forces. . . ."). While this
Note discusses what needs to be done in order to logistically implement the asserted
principle, such as establishing central authorities that can effectuate cross border
placements, it does not address the problems inherent in making sure that States
implement the obligations they undertake. For a general discussion on the
implementation of children's rights principles in international law, mostly in the
context of the CRC, see Alexandra Maravel, The U.N. Convention on the Rights of the
Child and the Hague Conference on Private International Law: The Dynamics of
Children's Rights Through Legal Strata, 6 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 309,
324-28 (1996).
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comply with this obligation when the parental resource resides
locally, regardless of whether an actual legal obligation exists.
The existence of an obligation becomes most crucial when
parental resources are located abroad - the situation when the
obligation will least often be recognized.
Another reason why this obligation should exist at the
international level is because adherence to the obligation
requires great amounts of cooperation between nations.
"International cooperation does not simply happen, it must be
consciously nurtured."13 The cross-border interaction necessary
to successfully place a child abroad is quite extensive. Most of
the time, both judicial and social services will be essential.
Without a specific international framework, cooperation will
not happen on its own.
Also, domestic enactments only insure that an
obligation is recognized domestically. Without law on the
international level, nations are less able to put pressure on
other nations to adhere to the obligation. These scenarios can
work both ways for a country. It concerns both local children
whose parental resources are abroad and also local parental
resources who want custody of a child living in a foreign
country. For example, a domestic obligation may benefit
children living in the United States who will be placed with
relatives living in another country; however, it cannot help
American children that may be stuck in foster care in a country
that does not likewise recognize such an obligation. Such
situations do occur, as illustrated by the case of L.H. v. Youth
Welfare Office of Wiesbaden, Germany.133 The case concerned an
American child who was placed in German foster care because
of abuse by her father." The child's father was an American
serviceman on duty in Germany.3 ' Because Germany adheres
to a policy quick to disregard parental priority in custody, child
welfare authorities refused to work with the mother toward
reunification and the child was never returned to the United
States.
The obligation must be a part of international law most
importantly because it is a matter of universal human rights.
132 Adair Dyer, The Internationalization of Family Law, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
625, 643 (1997).
... L.H. v. Youth Welfare Office of Wiesbaden, Germany, 568 N.Y.S.2d 852
(N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1991).
34 Id. at 853.
135 Id.
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The CRC and UDHR identify children's rights and familial
rights as human rights. Human rights are entitlements to
protection that should not vary depending on the jurisdiction.
If we decide that children are entitled to have their best
interests protected as a matter of international human rights,
then preserving family integrity and observing parental and
relative preferences are also international matters deserving
universal protection.
Moreover, social trends suggest the number of
transnational cases will increase. In the United States, the
number of children of foreign-born parents continues to rise.136
The number of American families living abroad is close to one
million.137 The increased mobility of families means an
increased number of child dependency cases concerning
children that have connections to more than one country. The
need for international standards grows as these cases become a
commonplace reality.
The ability of a legally codified obligation to truly
motivate reunifications and placements depends upon the
existence of a practical mechanism through which the
obligation can be realized. Even if international law fails to
assert an obligation (either through implication from principles
or through explicit codification), it should at least provide a
mechanism that will enable nations willing to take on the task
of placing a child abroad. States need a framework within
which they can cooperate with each other to secure the safe
transfer of custody.
There are two existing international legal instruments
that could prove to be useful frameworks in setting up such a
mechanism - the Hague Adoption Convention 3' and the Hague
Protection Convention.'39 The Hague Adoption Convention calls
136 See supra notes 1-2.
117 Karen M. Mills, U.S. Census Bureau, Americans Overseas in U.S.
Censuses, at 7 (Nov. 1993), available at http://www.census.gov/population/
www/socdemo/overseas/twps0062.html.
13 Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect
of Intercountry Adoption, May 29, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1134, pmbl [hereinafter Hague
Adoption Convention].
. The Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition,
Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for
the Protection of Children, Oct. 19, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1396 [hereinafter Hague Protection
Convention]. Although the United States and many other nations were actively
involved in the drafting of the treaty, the Hague Protection Convention has only been
signed and ratified by eight nations, including: Australia, the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Monaco, Morocco, and the Slovak Republic. Nevertheless, the
influence of the Convention is spreading slowly. Eighteen nations have recently signed
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for establishing a central authority in every country to assist in
all matters concerning cross-border adoptions. In order for an
international placement to succeed as a logistical matter,
nations must establish a central entity to serve as a
coordinating body. This entity can set standards of
communication and serve as a go-between for the local family
authorities involved on both sides. They can coordinate the vast
amounts of information that must be exchanged before the
sending state is satisfied that the parental resource abroad is
fit to take custody. The central authorities already established
under the Hague Adoption Convention can easily serve as
central authorities for international placements with parents
and relatives abroad. Since the issue of adoption and foster
care overlap in many respects, these authorities should easily
be able to adapt to the new responsibilities. For countries that
are not parties to the Hague Adoption Convention, these
central authorities provide a model for the types of entities that
would need to be established in order to effectively monitor the
implementation of international placements.
The Hague Protection Convention is the first
international instrument to address cross-border child welfare
issues in detail. The treaty specifically contemplates multi-
jurisdictional child welfare cases and covers a wide variety of
protection measures. "' Thus, it is directly applicable to the
situations contemplated by this Note - that is, cases where a
child becomes a ward of the state because of parental death or
parental abuse, but where the most viable parental resource is
abroad.
The Hague Protection Convention is useful because it
identifies a mechanism of jurisdictional transfer that could be
used in cases where a dependent child is located in one country
and the child's parental resource is located in another.'4' This
the Convention, totaling twenty-eight signatories all together. In addition to those who
ratified, signers include: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The Convention has
also been ratified by one nation that is not a member of the Hague Conference:
Ecuador. See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Hague Protection
Convention, at http://hcch.e-vision.nl/index-en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=70
(last visited Aug. 25, 2004).
0 Hague Protection Convention, Oct. 19, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1396. The
convention governs, among other things, (1) 'the supervision by a public authority of
the care of a child by any person having charge of the child", (2) "the attribution,
exercise, termination or restriction of parental responsibility," and (3) "the placement
of the child in a foster family... or an analogous institution." Id. art. 3(a),(e),(f).
141 Id. art. 8, 9.
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would entail handing custody of the child over to the receiving
country's child welfare officials (not the parental resource) so
that they may handle the process of reunification. The Hague
Protection Convention grants original jurisdiction to the
country where the child habitually resides (where the child has
been declared a dependent).4 ' The convention provides one
mechanism for the receiving state to issue the request for a
change of jurisdiction and another mechanism for the sending
state to initiate the request. A child may be transferred to any
jurisdiction of which the child is a national or to which the
child has a substantial connection.4 ' While the ultimate power
to decide jurisdiction is with the sending country, the sending
country is encouraged to consider whether another authority is
better situated to assess the best interests of the child.
By basing solutions to cross-border situations on
jurisdictional transfer, the convention minimizes the amount of
interaction two countries must have with one another in order
to fulfill their obligations. As such, this solution would likely be
popular with the international community since it is efficient
and respectful of jurisdiction, while also conforming to an
obligation to place children with parents or relatives.
There will be many situations, however, where the issue
of jurisdiction is not so clear-cut. In some cases, a sending
country may feel the receiving country cannot sufficiently
promote the welfare of a child. Sending countries may be
reluctant to allow the fate of children to be decided by other
jurisdictions with inadequate child protection laws. In other
cases, it may be unclear which nation is the habitual residence
of a child, thereby leaving the question of jurisdiction
unsettled.
The Hague Protection Convention gives little guidance
in cases of unclear jurisdiction. To address this common
problem, it should provide a mechanism that allows for joint
jurisdiction. While courts tend to disfavor sharing jurisdiction,
doing so may be the only way to truly decide and implement
the course of action that most reflects the best interests of a
child. The information and services necessary to accomplish the
best result for the child may be interspersed throughout both
jurisdictions, making both jurisdictions indispensable to the
142 Id. art. 5.
143 Also, but more relevant to cross-border divorce custody proceedings, the
child may be transferred to a jurisdiction where the child's property is located or where
an application for divorce has been made. Id. art. 8.
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proceedings. Such a mechanism would have to insist that
jurisdictions make a good faith effort to cooperate with each
other in working toward placement, including a procedure to be
followed when disputes arise.
While these conventions provide a starting point for
designing a mechanism to address the obligation, much more
must be specified. A mechanism for cooperation would have to
cover many practical matters. It would have to identify the
different ways to convey information, including such items as
psychological and medical evaluations, school and medical
records, home studies, and criminal background checks of
potential caregivers. The international framework would also
have to detail how services such as visitation and family
therapy can be provided and who would pay for them. It would
also have to identify how cross-border correspondence will
proceed and at which level - it would have to address, for
example, whether child welfare officials from both sides will
communicate directly or whether contact will take place on
another level, such as a court or consulate.
In the end, though, reluctance to trust another country's
child welfare system poses a threat to the implementation of
these mechanisms. Controversies will inevitably arise between
countries concerning which course of action is in the best
interests of the child. Every aspect of these cases is colored by
the different slants that can be taken on what is in a child's
best interests. Further complicating the matter, a few countries
may not even operate on this widely accepted principle. The
success of these mechanisms may therefore depend on
international standardization of general child protection
principles so that every state interested in cooperating in such
an effort is confident that other states also adhere to the
general standards. The CRC took a giant positive step in the
direction of realizing this goal and has set the stage for the
promulgation of treaties establishing mechanisms of
cooperation and implementation.
In the interim, while international child welfare law
continues to develop, the main factor determining the success
of these mechanisms will be how widely implemented they
become. The more they are recognized, the more they will
become trusted and the more some of these concerns will
diminish.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Child protection law may seem superficially simple
because custody determinations involve only one factor: the
best interests of the child. In reality, though, this single
overriding principle makes child protection law very
complicated. The concept of a child's best interests is nebulous
and involves a potential myriad of sub-factors. In order to make
sure it is applied consistently and in good faith, general
principles must be established to serve as guidelines. The
international community has identified the parental preference
and the relative preference as two of these general principles.
These principles clearly imply that a state is obligated to try to
reunify dependent children with their parents or to place them
with relatives. Unfortunately, when parents and relatives are
located far away, the state is less motivated to follow through
on this obligation. This is why the obligation must be codified
in a specific legal instrument, one that would operate most
effectively on the international level. There must also be a legal
mechanism through which this obligation can be practically
acted upon, or else international law will demand something
that is impossible to implement.
Child protection laws should follow the trend of
internationalization that is occurring in many other legal
fields. This Note focuses on just one example of a child
protection issue that is forcing itself onto the international
scene. As it becomes easier for families to shift national
residence, international guardianship cases will become more
common and the need for international child protection laws
more critical. Some of the same questions come up in other
contexts - especially immigration and international divorce
disputes. These and all other legal fields affecting child welfare
would benefit from the presence of specific international legal
standards of child protection. In the end, and no matter what
the context, the only way to truly promote the best interests of
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the world's children is by ensuring that the principles designed
to protect those interests gain universal recognition.
Amity R. Boye'
t J.D. Brooklyn Law School (2004); M.A. Philosophy, New York University
(2003); B.A. Wellesley College (1997). The author would like to express her sincere
appreciation to the staff of the Brooklyn Law Review and to her friends and family for
their unwavering support throughout the past year, especially Billy Tirado. The
author wishes next year's staff the best of luck in what will surely be a very successful
and prolific year.
